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FALSE DIAGNOSES: PITFALLS OF
TESTING FOR ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION IN INSURANCE MARKETS
David de Meza and David C Webb
London School of Economics
This version, February 2016
Abstract
Established tests for asymmetric information in insurance markets are
examined. The most commonly used, that information is symmetric if
high and low cover contracts have the same loss rate, is inconsistent with
standard assumptions that imply that under symmetric information, all
contracts o¤er full-cover. Incomplete cover and symmetric information
can be reconciled if there are claim-processing costs, but now existing tests
fare badly, partly due to the divergence between marginal and average
selection e¤ects. Ignoring the nature of loading factors may cause recent
studies to mismeasure the welfare costs of asymmetric information but
these problems are remedial.
Economistsfascination with insurance markets is mostly due to the theo-
retical possibility that their functioning is impaired by asymmetric information.
A substantial empirical literature, surveyed by Cohen and Seigelman (2010),
seeks to determine whether this is a problem in practice. In the view of many,
adverse selection justies major market interventions;
"That problem [adverse selection] is not an abstraction invented by
economists to justify trampling individual liberties. As experience
in most countries around the world has conrmed, it is a profound
source of market failure that renders unregulated insurance markets
a catastrophically ine¤ective way of providing access to health care."
Robert H Frank, New York Times, Aug 3 2010
We thank without implicating two referees, Eduardo Azevedo, Heski Bar-Isaac, Edmund
Cannon, Liran Einav, Hanming Fang, Amy Finkelstein, Daniel Gotlieb, Martin Hackmann,
Ian Jewitt, Mike Keane, Jonathon Kolstad, Amanda Kowalski, Clare Leaver, Jon Levin,
Ali McGuire, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Daniel Paravisini, Luis Rayo, Yona Rubinstein, Paul
Schrimpf, Dan Silverman and Catherine Thomas for useful comments. We are especially
appreciative of the willingness of Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Bruno Julien, Bernard Salanie and
Francois Salanie to engage with us despite their fundamental disagreement. Even more so
than usual, errors and omissions are the authors responsibility.
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As the quote indicates, the policy concern is not so much determining whether
selection e¤ects are present, but knowing whether they lead to substantial
ine¢ ciency. This does not diminish the importance of establishing whether
premiums incorporate selection e¤ects. As Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen
(2010) note, ". . . .detecting the existence of selection is a necessary precursor
to analysis of its welfare e¤ects." (p895).
Our concern is whether the evidence for asymmetric information has been
correctly interpreted. The most inuential methodology is that of Chiappori
and Salanie (2000), henceforth CS; which has inspired an upsurge in empiri-
cal work on contracts more generally. The procedure is to examine whether,
amongst observationally identical individuals, losses are increasing in insurance
cover. The rationale of this Positive-Correlation-Property (PCP ) test is that
if information is asymmetric, greater cover induces more reckless behavior and
attracts those with private knowledge that they are more than averagely prone
to loss. If "large" di¤erences in loss rates between contracts can be rejected, it
is concluded that information is close to symmetric.1 For young French drivers,
CS nd that buyers of comprehensive insurance do not experience signicantly
higher accident rates than those with only third-party cover. According to the
PCP -test, information symmetry cannot be rejected.
An augmented test is developed by Chiappori, Julien, Salanie and Salanie
(2006). This CJSS-test takes into account the often considerable administrative
cost of insurance. When applied to data on young French motorists, conclusions
are reversed from those in the earlier paper. The modied test "corroborates"
the presence of asymmetric information in the market for young French drivers.
Given that the two tests deliver conicting conclusions, it is natural to en-
quire, which, if either, is correct. It is easily seen that under standard assump-
tions the PCP test involves a contradiction. The reason is that if neither type
nor action is hidden, under standard assumptions, all contracts o¤er full cover.2
If a choice of cover is available, as the PCP -test requires, information is not
symmetric. One way to reconcile contractual choice with symmetric informa-
tion is to introduce administrative costs, often a major part of insurerscosts.
Increased cover may then lower expected income even when type is known.
The CJSS-test explicitly takes these costs into account, though as a concession
to realism rather than to eliminate the contradiction. An inequality is derived
which holds under asymmetric information, but as it also holds under symmetric
information, the CJSS-test cannot diagnose whether asymmetric information
is present.
This leaves open whether the PCP -test works when there are administrative
costs. de Meza and Webb (2001) show that claim processing costs may result
in a negative correlation (which they term advantageous selection) when type
1Puelz and Snow (1994) also use the PCP approach, though the statistical implementatiion
di¤ers from CS. Some studies incorrectly conclude that inability to reject a zero correlation
is evidence of symmetric information.
2That is, expected utility theory, competition and no administrative cost.
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is hidden.3 Hence, asymmetric information can never be rejected statistically.
Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) show that with xed administrative costs
and exogenously given contracts, the equilibrium may be e¢ cient whether or not
the insured have higher or lower loss rates than the uninsured. The Appendix
to our paper extends these results to endogenous contracts and claim processing
costs, allowing comparison between insurance contracts. It is also shown that a
zero correlation between distinct contracts does not imply e¢ ciency and that a
negative correlation is consistent with too much insurance.
Chade and Schlee (2014) also analyse administrative costs. Their paper
mostly concerns monopoly, but similar to our Observation 2A, they note that
under competition, a negative correlation is consistent with e¢ ciency. In their
case, preferences are homogeneous and administrative costs proportional to the
value of claims, whereas we have heterogeneous preferences but claim processing
costs.4
In the body of the paper we assume two risk classes but a continuum of risk
preferences and a xed contract. It is then easily seen that a welfare improving
tax (subsidy) is consistent with a positive or zero (negative or zero) correlation,
the opposite of the usual presumption.
An alternative to the correlation test is to nd or create experimentally an
exogenous premium change. The e¤ect on the loss rate of the policy is then
measured. Though this procedure is harder to implement than the correlation
test, we note that it is analytically related. In drawing welfare conclusions, it
remains necessary to take administrative costs into account.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains why admin-
istrative costs are more than an optional extra when testing for asymmetric
information. Then in Sections 3 and 4 we show that both the CJSS and PCP
tests for asymmetric information may be passed when information is symmet-
ric and claim-processing costs are present. Section 5 shows that the PCP -test
may misidentify the nature of selection e¤ects. In fact, how to dene adverse
and advantageous selection e¤ects becomes an issue. Section 6 discusses the
adequacy of premium change tests and their relation to the correlation test.
The implications of our analysis for estimating the welfare cost of asymmetric
information are examined in Section 7. Finally, brief conclusions are o¤ered.
1 The PCP -test is invalid under Rothschild-Stiglitz
assumptions
The seminal paper of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), henceforth RS; is invoked
by Chiappori and Salanie (2000, p.58) as a foundation for the PCP -test. RS as-
3Hemenway (1990) suggests that risk averse people may avoid risk and seek insurance and
o¤ers interesting evidence but does not analyse the role of administrative cost in establishing
a negative correlation in equilibrium.
4Chade and Schlee (2012) show that under monopoly, a convex relationship between pre-
mium and cover is consistent with adverse selection. So quantity discounts do not rule out
adverse selection.
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sume two types of risk-averse agent di¤ering only in loss probability. There are
two or more risk-neutral competitive insurance companies whose only costs are
indemnity payments. Assuming type is private information, any pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium must be separating. High-loss types are fully insured and low-
loss types are incompletely covered. Consistently with the PCP -test, asymmet-
ric information implies a positive correlation between cover and loss propensity.
The issue is what happens under symmetric information. Given actuarially fair
o¤ers, risk-averse agents prefer full cover. It is trivial that the Nash equilib-
rium is that everyone is fully insured. This though implies the PCP -test is
inapplicable as there is no variation in cover. The empirical ndings of CS are
inconsistent with the RS model when information is symmetric.
Observation 1. Under symmetric information, the RS assumptions imply
all contracts provide full cover.
The result is not restricted to the RS model. Nash competition, zero ad-
ministrative costs, insurer risk neutrality and rationality imply that the loading
factor is zero. Risk averse individuals prefer to equalise income across states
as long as this can be achieved without sacricing expected income. Observa-
tion 1 also applies under monopoly as each consumer type would be o¤ered the
e¢ cient contract with the seller extracting the full surplus.
2 Claim-Processing Costs
Observation 1 is trivial but potentially destructive. To preserve the correlation
based methodology, the RS assumptions must be tweaked so as to generate mul-
tiple cover levels under symmetric information. The potential modications are
to drop at least one of the assumptions: rational expectations; perfect competi-
tion; costless administration; or insurance company risk-neutrality. Introducing
administrative costs is the least fundamental change.5 If, though, such costs
are equal for all contracts, this does not resolve the problem. As competition
results in premiums equalling administrative cost plus expected indemnity pay-
ments, the expected income of the insured is the same whichever contract is
chosen. Customer risk aversion implies that greater cover will be preferred to
less. There is still no variation in cover under symmetric information, other than
between those not insuring at all and the fully insured.6 It is though almost
inevitable that administrative costs will vary between contracts. Assuming a
non-degenerate loss distribution, the lower the deductible the more claims there
are and the greater are expected processing costs. Under competition, adminis-
trative costs will be fully priced into contracts, so expected income is lower on
contracts o¤ering greater cover. Even under full information, contractual choice
depends on loss probabilities and risk preferences. So a variety of contractual
choices does not of itself imply asymmetric information.
5Administrative costs play a key role in generating a negative correlation in de Meza and
Webb (2001) whilst Chade and Schlee (2014) use them to explain why bad risks may be denied
insurance and to show the possibility of pooling under monopoly.
6Being uninsured may be chosen as this does raise expected income.
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Not only do claim-processing costs potentially explain the existence of con-
tractual variety under symmetric information, they are empirically relevant. We
are not aware of a detailed empirical analysis of claim processing costs, but have
examined individual insurance returns lodged with the then UK regulator, the
FSA. Claims management costs for non-life lines of insurance are reported at
between 8 per cent and 12 percent of claims paid across the di¤erent lines of
insurance. See also KPMG (2011), which puts the average loss ratio (net claims
and claims expenses as a percentage of net earned premiums) for UK general
insurance at 63%. So the payout ratio (claims as a percentage of premiums) is
very substantially below the 100% implied by RS assumptions. Total expenses
(not just claim processing costs) are some 32% of income.7
Introducing claim-processing costs is the minimal change to the RS assump-
tions that a test must cope with. The CJSS-test does explicitly allow for such
costs (though the motivation for their introduction is not obviously to recon-
cile a multiplicity of contracts with symmetric information). The rst issue is
whether the CJSS test can detect the presence of information asymmetry.
3 Administrative Costs and the Failure of the
CJSS test
The starting point of the CJSS analysis is a Revealed Preference Testthat is
necessary for rationality. In principle, this can be applied whatever the structure
of administrative costs, the extent of competition in the insurance market, or
its information structure.
Revealed Preference Test (RPT): ....., if an agent chooses one con-
tract, C1 over another with better coverage, C2, the decrease in premium must
be su¢ cient for the expected income of the agent to increase at unchanged be-
haviour (CJSS p.787)
If RPT does not hold, there must be some buyers of the low-cover contract
who would be better-o¤ if they switched to the high-cover policy. So either
the buyers are not observationally equivalent (so do not have the option to
switch) or at least some buyers are optimistic, i.e. understate their own accident
probability.8
CJSS next substitute out for the premiums in the RPT test. Assuming
competition and corporate risk neutrality, the premium on a policy equals the
expected cost of providing it, which is the expected payout under the policy plus
7Some estimates of payout ratios are here;
http://www.lovemoney.com/news/4378/insurance-policies-that-pay-outand-ones-that-
dont
For example, motoring 84%, property insurance 55%, travel insurance bought stand alone
67%, or bought through travel operators 40%, mobile phone insurance, 47%.
8There is a further implicit assumption. Insurees do not face any claim processing costs.
For some potential applicants, the psychic costs of claiming is substantial. If a low-deductible
policy involves more claims then even for a risk averse individual it may not be preferable
even if expected monetary income is no lower.
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the expected cost of administering it.9 Using the actual loss rates associated
with each policy and making an assumption about the nature of administra-
tive costs enables the premiums to be estimated. Replacing in the RPT the
actual premiums with the derived premiums yields the CJSS-test inequality-
their inequality 7 or its unnumbered successor.10 If the inequality is violated
and the assumptions on loading factors are correct, some buyerswould obtain
an increase in expected income from switching to a higher cover policy which
is inconsistent with risk aversion and rationality. Notice that in deriving the
inequality, no assumption has been made concerning whether information is
symmetric or asymmetric. Hence, satisfaction of the inequality cannot speak to
the information structure. In fact, failure to satisfy inequality 7 does not even
imply irrationality, as the constructed premiums may not equal the premiums
actually charged to clients.
To emphasise, the test inequalities are correctly derived from the assump-
tions. Realism of the assumptions is not the issue. The problem is that the
inequalities also hold if information is symmetric. Hence, satisfaction of the
inequalities cannot test for asymmetric information.
CJSS examine whether their inequality is satised in the data. Assuming
a proportional loading factor ( in their paper) set at a reasonable level, they
nd that for young French motorists the inequality holds. According to CJSS:
"Our conclusion is that this test gives evidence for the positive correlation
property: the null of zero correlation is rejected. By taking into account both
the dispersion of claims and the cost structure of the insurer, we are able to
corroborate the presence of asymmetric information."(p.795).
The objection to drawing this conclusion is not that theories can never be
proved empirically as opposed to not falsied but that satisfaction of the in-
equality provides no evidence either way concerning information structure. For
the inequality to hold, the average low-cover individual would experience a fall in
expected income from switching to a high-cover contract. Finding that expected
income would decline is consistent with rationality, as long as the assumption
concerning the loading factor is realistic, whether or not asymmetric information
is present. Not switching when higher cover raises expected income is irrational
even if information is symmetric. Therefore the inequality is uninformative as
to the presence of asymmetric information. It is not even a su¢ cient condition
for asymmetric information.
Observation 2 The CJSS test cannot detect the presence of asymmetric
information.
9As CJSS point out, the zero-prot condition of competition is more restrictive than
necessary. Their inequality holds as long as the higher coverage policy is no less protable
than the low coverage policy.
10 In the notation of CJSS, Rh(L), h = 1; 2, are payouts as a function of the loss, L; for
contract Ch ; Fh(L) are the distribution of loss functions associated with the contracts. 
represents a loading factor proportional to claim size, presumably reecting transaction costs
and Eh(L) =
R
LdFh(L) are expected claims from contract Ch. CJSS derive and apply their
Inequality (7),
R
R2(L)dF2(L) 
R
R2(L)dF1(L)  [E1(L)  E2(L)], to test for asymmetric
information.
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4 Administrative Costs and the Failure of the
PCP -Test
The failure of the CJSS test does not directly imply that the PCP -test breaks
down in the presence of administrative costs. To examine, as simply as possible,
whether this is the case, we follow the theoretical papers of Einav, Finkelstein
and Cullen (2010) and Mahoney and Weyl (2014) in taking contracts as xed.
The Appendix endogenises contracts in a two-type or three-type setting, nding
similar results.11
When contracts are prescribed by regulation, the assumption of exogenous
contracts is often appropriate. It is true, for example, of Medigap insurance,
studied by Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008). They nd the healthy buy more
insurance, attributable to selection e¤ects arising from heterogeneous income
and cognitive ability. This could be regarded as advantageous selection, but we
show that it does not follow that the market is ine¢ ciently large.
In general, standard theoretical models struggle to endogenise contracts so
as to encompass two stylised facts; a) most contracts involve some degree of
pooling b) there are normally relatively few contracts in the market. The rst
property is famously ruled out in the RS model, but an important recent paper
by Azevedo and Gottlieb (2014), AG;makes considerable progress. They assume
a continuum of consumers di¤ering with respect to loss probabilities and risk
preferences. A Nash equilibrium involving a continuum of pooling contracts is
shown to exist in most cases. So the puzzle of why there are so few contracts
remains.
As a compromise between tractability, conformity with the characteristics
of typical insurance markets, and desirability of explaining all the features,
suppose only a single contract is allowed.12 The cost of processing a claim
is c:13 There are two unobservable risks types who di¤er in their exogenous
probability of su¤ering a xed nancial loss of Z.14 For high-risk types, the
chance of loss is h > l where the latter is the loss probability of low risks.
Moral hazard is initially absent. There is a non-degenerate distribution of an
unobservable risk-aversion parameter for each risk-type.15 Conditional on risk-
11This is a mild extension of the Appendix to Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) who
assume xed contracts and no pooling.
12 If exclusionary contracts are impossible, there is just one contract in equiklibrium. For
example, sellers do not monitor an individuals total holding of annuities (Abel (1986)). Con-
tracts must, therefore, be linear. The mix of buyers xes the purchase price of a given income
stream. Each type buys a di¤erent quantity of annuities and the main features of our model
apply.
13Were there no administrative costs all bad risks participate in a pooling equilibrium since
doing so must raise their expected income as well as lowering their risk, Hence, if there are
any uninsured, they must have a lower accident rate than the insured.
14Moral hazard lowers the loss rate of the uninsured. A zero correlation can therefore result
from advantageous selection o¤setting moral hazard. There is nevertheless market failure due
to selection e¤ects as those insuring following a premium fall would lower precautions and so
have higher losses than the incumbents.
15Multidimensional heterogeneity is not necessary for the results. Similar e¤ects are possible
if types only di¤er in risk preference but there is hidden action as well as hidden types, as In
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type, demand for the insurance contract is therefore smoothly decreasing in
premium. For high risks, demand is H(p) and for low risks it is L(p) where
the premium is p: For example, under CARA, utility is  e rY : A high risk
individual charged a premium at which they are just willing to buy a full-cover
policy satises p = log(1 h+he
rZ)
r ; which is increasing in the CARA parameter,
r; and in h. Writing the cut o¤ risk preference as r = r(p; h); and CDF i as
the group i distribution function of r; the demand curve of the high-risk types is
H(p) = f1 CDFH [r(p; h)]gnh where nh is group h size: Similarly, the demand
by the low risks is L(p) = f1   CDFL[r(p; l)]gnl: Although r(p; h) < r(p; l);
demand by the high risks is not necessarily higher at given p, it all depends on
the cdfs of the two groups. The per capita demand curves could cross, indeed
they must do so if one cdf is su¢ ciently compressed relative to the other. In
general, the positions of the demand curves of the two groups relative to each
other depends on the cdfs, on which no plausible restrictions can be imposed.
The demand curves can in e¤ect be regarded as the primitives.
There are constant returns to individual rms in o¤ering contracts, so in
a competitive equilibrium, companies expect to breakeven, inclusive of claim
processing costs, with the premium satisfying16
[hH(pe) + lL(pe)](Z + c)
H(pe) + L(pe)
= pe
To determine whether this outcome is e¢ cient, note that at premium p;
aggregate benet, the sum of consumer surplus and the nancial surplus, is
W (p) =
Z 1
p
[H(p) + L(p)]dp+ [p   (Z + c)h][H(p) + L(p)] (1)
Assuming the policy maker does not observe type and sets the premium to
maximise aggregate surplus (ignoring any deadweight costs from raising rev-
enue), the F.O.C. is
dW (p)
dp
=
H 0(p)p
H
H[1  (Z + c)h
p
] +
L0(p)p
L
L[1  (Z + c)l
p
]
=  HH(1 
h(Z + c)
p
)  LL(1 
l(Z + c)
p
) = 0 (2)
where i =   i
0(p)p
i > 0 i = H;L: As h > l; to satisfy the equation, the second
bracket of (2) must be positive. If p is an optimum, the nancial surplus is
therefore
 (p) = pH(1  h(Z + c)
p
) + pL(1  l(Z + c)
p
)
= pL(1  l(Z + c)
p
)(1  L
H
) (3)
de Meza and Webb (2001).
16For an individual seller, marginal and average revenue is the ruling premium. Marginal
and average cost is the expected claim per policy inclusive of claim processing cost.
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where the second equality follows from (2). Thus, at an optimum,  7 0 as
H 7 L:17 Relative elasticities determine whether a tax or subsidy is necessary
for optimality, but play no role in the PCP test.18 Specically, if the total
number of individuals of each type is ni; the positive correlation property holds
iff hH+lLH+L <
h(nH H)+l(nL H)
nH+nL H L :So the PCP test does not identify whether
a subsidy or tax is required or whether the market should be contracted or
expanded. Relative elasticities depend in the relative density of the risk aversion
parameters of the marginal types of each risk class, about which no obvious
restrictions apply.
The analysis is illustrated in Figure (1) which shows demand by the two risk-
types, equally numerous in the population, and from which the cost curves of
Figure (2) are derived. The demand curves are chosen to generate non monotone
average cost. To follow the mechanics, note that at all premiums between p1
and p4; H(p) > L(p); so the insured have a lower loss rate than the uninsured.
According to the PCP -test, if the premium settles in this range there is adverse
selection. At premiums between p1 and p2 the only buyers are bad risks so the
marginal cost of expansion resulting from premium cuts is constant and equal to
average cost. Below p2 good risks enter and therefore average cost of provision
starts to fall. The ratio of good to bad risks reaches a maximum at p so average
cost has a turning point here. Below p3 all n bad risks are insured and further
premium falls only attract good risks. Hence, average cost falls reaching a global
minimum when all good risks are insured. The equilibrium premium is pe; but
the global maximum involves market contraction and the higher premium of po:
It is easily seen that if, say, administrative costs were higher there could be
an interior equilibrium, where the loss rate of the insured equals that of the
17Relative elasticities depend on the distribution of risk preferences. Where the pdf is dense
elasticity will be high. if one type has a much more concentrated distribution than the other
demand curves will typically cross.
18The optimal premium does not replicate the full information outcome. It is the best
pooling outcome. Under full information, there would be fewer bad risks and more good.
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uninsured but a tax is welfare improving.19 Reversing the labels on the demand
curves of Figure 1, a parallel analysis allows a negative or zero correlation but
a premium subsidy is welfare improving. The key to local e¢ ciency is whether
a premium cut will change the proportion of low risks in the pool and therefore
a¤ect the average cost of supplying policies.
Observation 3 In a pooling equilibrium, local expansion (contraction) of the
market is e¢ ciency enhancing if the demand elasticity of the low risks is greater
(lesser) than the high risks and does not depend on the loss rate of the insured
relative to the uninsured. For global e¢ ciency, not even the relative magnitude
of the elasticities determines whether expansion or contraction is appropriate.
That the sign of selection e¤ects depends on the magnitude of the premium
change has implications for what is really meant by adverse selection. Con-
sider two recent, contradictory, denitions. According to Einav, Finkelstein
and Levin (2010, p316), EFL; adverse (advantageous) selection is present if it
would be less (more) costly per capita to insure the whole population. That is,
the sign of the di¤erence between the loss rates of the insured and the uninsured
(the correlation test) denes the nature of selection. In the context of a single
exogenous contract model, Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010), EFC; state
"....the sign of the slope of the marginal cost curve tells us whether the resultant
selection is adverse (if marginal cost is increasing in price) or advantageous (if
marginal cost is decreasing in price)." (p.879). As just illustrated, it is perfectly
possible one denition would classify a market as subject to adverse selection
and the other as advantageous.
Of course, denitions cannot be right or wrong, just more or less useful. The
19To illustrate, suppose h = 0:079; l = 0:083; Z = 10; c = 0:19:and and all utility functions
are CARA. If p = 1;the marginal H has r = 0:04 and the marginal L has r = 0:05:If the rs
are uniformly distributed with support [0:02; 0:08] for the Ls and [0:03; 0:05] for the H0s;then
at p = 1 half of each group is insured making average cost 1:A competitive equilibrium is
therefore found in which the correlation between the loss rate of the insured and uninsured is
zero but as demand by Hs is more elastic, a tax is welfare improving.
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purpose of a denition is therefore relevant in judging its value. In many cases,
the reason for distinguishing adverse and advantageous selection is to identify
the nature of market failure and the appropriate policy response. A denition
along EFC lines is then the most appropriate, with two qualications. Rather
than the slope of marginal cost, the slope of average cost is the appropriate
measure. This is because the sign of the local externality is given by the sign
of the di¤erence between average and marginal cost, which equals the sign of
the slope of average cost. If marginal cost is monotone, so is average cost, but
the reverse is not the case. Secondly, when average cost is not monotone, EFC
gives the correct answer for local changes but a global optimum may require the
opposite change in coverage.
The EFL denition does not directly determine the nature of welfare im-
proving interventions, either local or global. It is perhaps best seen as a descrip-
tive measure of overall selection.
These denitions have analogues when there are multiple endogenous con-
tracts, as very neatly shown in the competitive model of Azevedo and Gottlieb
(2015). Loosely expressed, their denition of selection e¤ects considers buyers
taking a particular contract and computes their loss rate (including moral haz-
ard e¤ects) if all switched to an adjacent, higher cover contract. The loss rate of
the switchers is then compared to the existing loss rate on that contract. This
comparison is similar in spirit to the EFL denition. As AG note, this is a
local result in that the sign of the comparison may depend on which contract
it is measured at. A second measure, implicit in AG; looks at the consequences
of decreasing the price of all contracts o¤ering cover in excess (or below) some
threshold by the same small increment.20 There will be one-way substitution
from slightly lower cover contracts. The loss rate of the switchers is compared
to those already choosing the threshold contract. This measure di¤ers from the
rst because the mix of switchers induced by a price change may not be the
same as all those buying the relevant adjacent contract. The measure can be
used to determine whether a premium change would raise welfare and is similar
to EFC: Again, it is a local measure.
Taking all these issues into account, a possible policy orientated denition
of selection e¤ects follows. Adverse (advantageous) selection is present if under
full information everyone has at least as much cover as in the equilibrium. As
noted, the e¤ect of asymmetric information on cover may not have the same
sign for everyone, so even this denition is incomplete nor does this denition
always lead to the same classication as the PCP test or the EFL and EFC
denitions.
5 Premium-change Tests
A correlation test implicitly estimates the e¤ect of a particular premium change.
In the case of Figure 2, it is the e¤ect on the loss rate were the premium lowered
from the equilibrium of pe to p4; at which level everyone is insured. A caveat is
20AG use this measure to determine the optimal premium schedule.
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that, to the extent moral hazard is present, the loss rate of the uninsured would
be higher were they actually insured. This obscures the selection e¤ects on which
e¢ ciency depends. It is not the only issue. As shown in the previous section,
whatever the nature of selection over the price interval that attracts all buyers,
the opposite form of selection may apply locally. The selection designation may
therefore be misleading, along with policy based on it. Finally, the correlation
test gives no indication how large a premium change is needed to induce all to
buy. This prevents the estimation of welfare cost or the determination of the
appropriate policy level.
For these reasons, it is useful to examine the e¤ect of exogenous premium
changes (preferably many of them) on loss rates. Of course, it is empirically
much more demanding to implement a premium change test than to conduct
a correlation test. One method is to nd a natural experiment, such as a tax
change, or the introduction of a mandate, as in Hackmann, Kolstad and Kowal-
ski (2015). Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) nd a company that o¤ers
di¤erent deals to workers in otherwise similar business units for seemingly ar-
bitrary reasons. Finally, price-change tests can also be implemented through a
specially designed eld experiment, as exemplied by Karlan and Zinman (2009)
for a consumer loan market or for insurance contracts by Gunnsteinsson (2012)
and Polimeni and Levine (2012).
If multiple contacts are available in the market, a premium change in a single
intermediate contract will typically lead to substitutions a¤ecting both higher
and lower cover contracts, making it di¢ cult to draw conclusions. In principle,
a full demand system should be estimated. As noted by Azevedo and Gottlieb
(2015) and discussed in the previous section, if the premium change is applied to
all contracts above or below some cover threshold, clean selection e¤ects can be
identied. This is automatic if the experiment is conducted for the highest cover
policy available in the market.21 A special case is when there is only a single
market policy or there is virtually no private insurance at all, as is the case in
the experiments of Gunnsteinsson (2012) and Polimeni and Levine (2012). In
summary, the correlation test amounts to an estimate of the selection e¤ects of
a possibly large price change but the critique of its reliability applies to price
changes whatever their magnitude.
Observation 4 The PCP test is equivalent to a specic premium-change
test plus any moral-hazard e¤ects.
6 Welfare Measurement
Estimates of how premium changes a¤ect demand and loss rates have been used
to quantify the welfare consequences of asymmetric information and the benets
of counteracting interventions. What has often been neglected is that the nature
of Ioading factors potentially has major e¤ects on the welfare measure.
21 If it is the-low cover policy, a discount will attract the otherwise uninsured and those
with high cover so again, there will be ambiguous results even in the presence of asymmetric
information.
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To see the role of claim processing cost, consider the single-contract pooling
model of Section 5. The average cost of providing n contracts to the highest
willingness to pay types is
A = p(n)(Z + c) = p(n)(1 +m)Z (4)
where p is the average loss rate, Z is the insured loss, and m = c=Z; the loading
factor due to claim processing costs. The corresponding social marginal cost is
dnA
dn
= [p(n) + np0(n)](1 +m)Z = p(n)[1 + ](1 +m)Z (5)
where  = p0n=p is the elasticity of the aggregate loss rate with respect to n, the
sign of which identies the nature of the local selection e¤ect. The absolute gap
between average and marginal cost is p(n)(1+m)Z. If the surplus created by a
marginal change in market size in the benecial direction is calculated without
taking claim processing cost into account, it will, therefore, be overestimated
by proportion m: For nite changes, the error will be greater as for all intra-
marginal units, price does not equal average cost.
To illustrate, consider, for example, the Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski
(2015), HKK; study of the e¤ect of the introduction of a mandate on the indi-
vidual health insurance market in Massachusetts. The mandate involves ning
non-buyers, so has the e¤ect of increasing demand for insurance. HKK estimate
that claims per policy fall, indicating adverse selection.22 In Figure 3, average
22 In the initial equilibrium the claims of marginal buyers are estimated to be some 60% of
the average buyer. So there is considerable adverse selection.
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claim costs per policy are AC with associated marginal cost MC: Adding the
loading factor brings average cost to AC. The mandate shifts demand from
DD to D0D0 with equilibrium sales increasing from no to n1. HKK assume
the marginal social cost of providing extra policies is just the extra claims. The
welfare gain from counteracting adverse selection is, therefore, the sum of the
two shaded areas in Figure 3. If, though, the loading factor is due to claim
processing cost (or reserve requirements), true marginal cost is higher at MC:
Hence, only the upper shaded area should be included in the welfare gain from
the mandate. In the HKK case, this lowers the gain from the mandate by
about a third.
According to HKK, loading factors are not cost based but are pure prot.
This interpretation is also problematic. The double shaded area is designated
by HKK as the welfare gain due to o¤setting the adverse selection distortion.
Accepting their assumption that payment of claims are the only variable cost,
makes this designation debatable. Even if average claim cost is constant and
equal to marginal cost, so there are no selection e¤ects, there is still an upper
shaded area so market expansion, if not too great, yields a gain. The reason
is that if loading factors do not reect variable cost, the loading factor is itself
a distortion o¤set by the mandate. The welfare gain area is the result of two
distortions and to attribute it only to selection e¤ects does not seem appropriate,
most dramatically illustrated when there is no selection e¤ect.23
Under advantageous selection, average cost is rising, and a competitive mar-
ket over expands. Now, for e¢ ciency, buying insurance that should be taxed
rather than not buying it. The analysis goes into reverse and ignoring claim
processing costs, which add to marginal cost, leads to an underestimate of the
e¢ ciency gain from market contraction.
Observation 5 In competitive equilibria with given contracts, if the e¤ect
of a premium change on costs is limited to the outlay on claims, under adverse
(advantageous) selection, the welfare gain from market expansion (contraction)
is over (under) estimated.
Loading factors also drive the results in Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf
(2010), EFS . They provide a sophisticated measurement of the welfare costs of
selection e¤ects in the UK annuity market. Three annuity contracts di¤ering
in the duration of the guaranteed payment were available in the market. The
paper rst applies the correlation test to establish whether asymmetric infor-
mation is present. Mortality is not monotone in guarantee length, suggesting
an ambiguous answer.24
23Following imposition of the mandate, the loading factor actually fell from 11% to 2%.
HKK attribute this to increased competition eating into prot and regulation prohibiting
di¤erentiation between group and individual rates. The expansion in sales due to the fall in
loading factor is given a separate welfare measurement, not due to adverse selection. A 2%
loading factor is extremely low. On average, medical loading factors on individual contracts are
much higher, in the range 17%-21% (Cox, Gary Claxton, and Larry Levitt (2013)). Perhaps
insurers are willing to take a temporary loss to sign up the new buyers in the expectation of
making money from them later in the HKK case.
24The middle option is by far preferred, possibly because buyers are confused and avoid
extremes.
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To estimate the magnitude of the e¢ ciency cost of asymmetric information,
EFS adopt a structural approach. Specic forms for the utility and hazard
function are assumed, allowing mortality and preference parameters to be cali-
brated from the observed distribution of contractual choices. Were symmetric
information to replace asymmetric information, it is assumed that the same
three guarantee durations would be o¤ered, with each contract priced according
to individual-specic mortality risk. The crucial assumption is that symmetric
information equalises loading factors. Specically, every annuity is priced such
that the expected payout ratio is the weighted average of the three loading fac-
tors observed in the initial market equilibrium. Under this assumption, EFS
show that introduction of symmetric information results in everyone switching
to the longest duration contract. Rerunning the model assuming asymmetric in-
formation but equal loading factors also results in everyone choosing the longest
contract. Asymmetric information, therefore, imposes a welfare cost only if it is
the cause of unequal loading factors. EFS (footnote 16, p.1066) note that this is
a key but debatable assumption. Unlike HKK; loading factors are taken to be
a consequence of asymmetric information. A possible theoretical justication is
that in contrast to a Nash equilibrium, in an anticipatory equilibrium (Wilson
(1977)), cross subsidies are possible in the setting of exclusive insurance con-
tracts (Miyazaki (1977), Spence (1978). High cover contracts taken by the high
risks are sold below cost. Annuities are not exclusive contracts, however. Un-
equal loading factors under asymmetric information could alternatively be due
to administrative costs, di¤erential corporate risk costs, imperfect competition
or actuarial mistakes.25 In all these cases, loading factors will not be equalised
by symmetric information.
If the EFS assumption is valid, it provides an easy test for the presence of
asymmetric information; whether loading factors di¤er across contracts. The
assumption is, though, hard to believe.
7 Conclusion
According to the correlation test, hidden types and hidden action are absent
if distinct insurance policies chosen by observationally identical types have the
same loss rate. This claim involves a contradiction. If information is symmetric,
the standard model implies that all contracts o¤er full cover. Claim processing
costs and other ingredients of loading factors, often large in practice, allow a
variety of contractual forms. These costs are incorporated in the CJSS test,
but the inequality proposed as a su¢ cient condition for asymmetric information
also applies when information is symmetric.
With claim processing costs, the standard PCP test cannot be relied on.
Even with no moral hazard, a zero correlation does not rule out hidden types,
nor does the sign of the correlation necessarily sign local selection e¤ects, which
25Cannon and Tonks (2014) provide strong arguments that risk varies over contracts and
will be reected in premiums. It, therefore, has the same e¤ects as administrative cost.
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may be the relevant e¤ects to judge market failure. These results have a para-
doxical element. If two contracts are o¤ered to observably identical types, but
the loss rates of buyers are very di¤erent, it seems that selection e¤ects must
be present. They are, but the choice of many buyers may be unresponsive to
variation in premiums over particular ranges and their loss characteristics may
be very di¤erent to those of the responders. The correlation test goes wrong, at
least for policy purposes, because it implicitly assumes the ranking of contracts
by average and marginal loss rate coincide, and the relationship is invariant to
where it is measured.26 There seems no natural way to rule out divergences,
nor to conclude that they must be small. Multiple exogenous premium changes,
if available, can help and may be used to evaluate the welfare cost of hidden
types and the benets of remedial action. These estimates depend heavily on
the nature of loading factors, whether cost based, due to imperfect competi-
tion or asymmetric information itself. This does not seem to have been fully
appreciated. Administrative costs are not normally negligible or innocuous in
understanding insurance markets.
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APPENDIX
ENDOGENOUS CONTRACTS
The results of Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) call the correlation
test into question, showing that a non-zero correlation between cover and loss
is consistent with e¢ ciency when there are xed administrative costs. They as-
sume insurance contracts are exogenously given, remarking "Endogenizing the
equilibrium contract set is di¢ cult when unobserved heterogeneity in risk pref-
erences and risk types is allowed..." (p.5) but consider it likely that the results
will hold even if contract form is endogenised. We now show that the main re-
sults do carry over, but there are some restrictions on what can be observed and
some additional possibilities are noted. In particular, we show that a negative
correlation, normally associated with advantageous selection, is consistent with
less insurance than under full information, and a zero correlation between dis-
tinct policies does not imply the equilibrium is e¢ cient.27 In our analysis, claim
processing costs rather than xed administrative costs are assumed. Whereas
xed costs independent of contract can explain diverse full-information choices
between insurance and no insurance, to do the same between contracts requires
claim processing costs or some other reason why administrative costs di¤er be-
tween contracts. For simplicity, in what follows only a single loss is possible.
As a result, full information outcomes can only involve di¤erences between the
uninsured and the insured. If two or more loss levels are possible, all results
apply to comparisons of more and less (but still positive) insurance.
The assumptions we work with are as follows:
a) All individuals have the same income endowment, Y; but may su¤er -
nancial loss Z:
b) The probability a high (low) risk type has an accident is h (j).
c) There are at least two risk-neutral insurance companies making simulta-
neous o¤ers of insurance contracts. A contract is dened by deductible d and
the premium charged to risk type j; pj :
d) Processing an insurance claim costs the company c irrespective of the size
of the claim.
e) In addition to being high or low risk, individuals may have high risk
aversion denoted by R; or low risk aversion by r. Let V ij denote the expected
utility of risk type j with increasing, strictly concave utility function of risk
aversion type i; U i, so
V ij = jU i(Y  Z + (Z   d)+   pj)  (1  j)U i(Y   pj) i = r;R: j = h; l: (1A)
The insurers break-even premium for an individual of known risk is given
by
pj = j((Z   d) + c) (6)
The rst task is to determine how claim processing costs inuence full infor-
mation choices.
27With exogenous contracts, Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2007) nd that a full pooling
equilibrium may arise. This though is not a zero correlation which requires distinct contracts
have the same loss rates.
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Observation 1A If two insurance buyers have the same preferences but
di¤er in their full information choices, the low loss type is fully covered and the
high loss type is uninsured.28
Proof If insurance is to be bought, full cover is the best buy as increments
in cover are available on actuarially fair terms. So insurance is bought under
full information iff
U(Y   (Z + c)) > U(Y   Z) + (1  )U(Y ) (3A)
where  is loss probability treated for analytical reasons as a continuous variable.
When  = 0; there is no advantage in insuring and if  = 1 the claim processing
cost implies it is best not to insure. The slope of the LHS of (3A) in expected
utility-loss probability space is  (Z+c)U 0(Y  (Z+c)) and so is decreasing in
. The slope of the RHS of (3A) is constant. The two sides of (3A) are plotted
in Figure 1A. Observation 1A is immediate.
The reason for introducing claim processing costs is to allow for di¤erent
choices under full information. Observation 1A implies that if this occurs and
preferences are the same for both high and low risks, there cannot be an asym-
metric information equilibrium. Such an equilibrium, as in RS; involves sepa-
ration with full cover by the high risks, but this contradicts the full information
preference for no insurance. In what follows, preferences therefore di¤er between
risk types.
The remainder of the Appendix is concerned with equilibria in which the
PCP test fails. If the full information and hidden types equilibria coincide,
then the latter is e¢ cient, so there are no selection e¤ects. In line with the
discussion in the text, if there is unambiguously less (more) insurance than in
the rst-best full information case then there is adverse (advantageous) selection.
28This does not hold for xed administrative costs as assumed by Einav, Finkelstein and
Schrimpf.
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Observation 2A A negative correlation between cover and loss probability
is consistent with e¢ ciency.
Figure 2A shows the o¤er curves of the two risk classes under full infor-
mation. As ex ante moral hazard is absent, o¤er curves are linear, and lower
for the better risks. As the deductible approaches the loss, insurance tends to
zero, but claim processing costs are still involved. Lower indi¤erence curves are
preferred to higher. The outcome if insurance is not taken is contract Z. In the
conguration shown, high risks are insured under full information but the more
risk tolerant low risks are not. If information is asymmetric, the equilibrium is
unchanged. Full cover is now even less attractive to good risks if o¤ered on the
terms appropriate to bad risks. Similarly, the attraction of partial cover is not
enhanced for the good risks relative to the full information case.
Observation 3A A negative correlation between cover and loss probability
is consistent with less insurance than under full information.
Following Smart (2000), Wambach (2000) and de Meza and Webb (2001),
Figure 3A shows a partial-pooling equilibrium. Here, good risks are more risk
averse than bad risks, who, for simplicity, are assumed to be risk neutral (so
o¤er curves and indi¤erence curves coincide). Under full information, bad risks
are uninsured. Good risks are risk averse and choose full cover under full in-
formation. When types are hidden, the equilibrium policy is at E with all the
good risks buying. Bad risks are equally well-o¤ buying the policy or going
uninsured, with the number buying just enough to yield zero expected prot on
the contract. Any deviation that leaves the good risks at least as well o¤ brings
all the bad risks into the market, rendering the deviation unprotable.
It is not obvious whether this equilibrium should be characterised as adverse
or advantageous selection or neither. The average loss probability of the insured
is lower than the uninsured. Some bad risks are insured when for a rst best
outcome they should not be, whilst all good risks buy less insurance than under
full information.
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Observation 4A :A positive correlation does not imply ine¢ ciency
This case, illustrated in Figure 4A, again involves all good risks being risk
averse whilst, for simplicity, the bad risks are risk neutral. Under full informa-
tion, the good risks are fully covered but the bad risks are better o¤ uninsured,
avoiding the burden of the claim processing costs. Note that even if the bad risks
could take full cover on the same terms as the good risks, thereby beneting
from a cross subsidy, this is insu¢ cient to fully o¤set their claim processing costs
so their expected income would fall. Hence, the full information equilibrium is
also the asymmetric information equilibrium.
Observation 5A A zero correlation between distinct policies does not imply
e¢ ciency.
This time three types are necessary to make the point. Low risks are divided
into high and low risk aversion types, the latter risk neutral. As shown in Figure
5A, under full information, the former take full cover and the latter do not insure.
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Bad risks are all high risk aversion and choose full cover under full information.
When risk type is private information, there is an equilibrium in which bad risks
are fully covered, the more risk averse of the good risks are partially covered at
E and the risk neutral good risks are uninsured. The key property is the relative
slope of the indi¤erence curves through E. The bad risks must have a bigger
premium cut to compensate for a given increase in deductible than the good
risks. At E, deviation to lower cover (increased d) on terms that retain good
risks,continues to separate but is unprotable. Increasing cover fails to separate
if the terms are set to retain good risks and is therefore also unprotable. The
hidden types equilibrium has the property that there is zero correlation between
the loss rates of those with partial and no cover, though the fully insured have
higher loss rate. Asymmetric information has resulted in underinsurance by
high risk aversion, low risk types, but a comparison between the uninsured and
the partially insured nds no di¤erence in loss rates.
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